We give a counter-example showing that Carmo and Jones' condition 5(e) may conflict with the other conditions on the models in their paper A new approach to contrary-to-duty obligations.
Deontic logic
Deontic logic (the logic of duties) has been studied more or less intensively throughout history. Given the emergence of modern modal logic one began to use logical systems to formalize valid logical deduction in connection with norms and obligations.
We shall denote systems with capital letters like K, schemata with parenthesized capital letters like (K), and particular sentences with italicized letters like A.
1
The smallest normal modal logic system, K, is the smallest expansion of propositional logic with an operator (and a dual operator = ¬ ¬) having the axiom schema (K) and rule of inference (RN).
Standard deontic logic KD is K expanded by the following axiom schema.
A → A (D)
A standard model of modal logic is a structure (W, R, · ) where W is the set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W , and A = { x ∈ W : |= x A }. A model of standard deontic logic is then a standard model of modal logic in which R is serial, i.e., there is an ideal alternative y for each world x, which in turn means that |= x , which in normal systems is equivalent to |= x D. This expresses that duties cannot be mutually contradictory. Indeed, if we employ an operator for it is mandatory that and assume that there is a proposition A such that |= x A ∧ ¬A, we obtain that in all ideal alternatives to x, A ∧ ¬A holds, i.e., there is no ideal alternative to x. Since the symbol is often reserved for concepts of necessity, one introduces a special symbol for deontic necessity, duty: , with the dual operator P (permissibility).
In a 1963 article [6] , Chisholm pointed out that standard models are insufficient for deontic logic in the sense that they, as we shall see, necessarily lead to paradoxes.
In this article we shall discuss Chisholm's paradox and a solution proposed by Carmo and Jones [2] in 1996. We shall call their system CJ.
Contrary-To-Duty imperatives
Contrary-To-Duty (CTD) imperatives (or breach of duty imperatives) are duties that take effect when an ideal obligation has been violated. It was these that Chisholm showed can not be formalized in standard deontic logic.
Chisholm's set of propositions is (a) A certain man ought to go to help his neighbor.
(b) It ought to be the case that if he goes, he tells the neighbor that he is coming.
(c) If he does not go, he ought not to say that he is coming.
(d) He is not going.
A formalization should take into account that intuitively this set is consistent and logically independent. If, as Chisholm, one formalized it in standard deontic logic KD, where the operator or is understood as "it is duty that", as
then we can deduce S (from (a) and (b)) and ¬S (from (c) and (d)) which implies ⊥ which via schema D gives P⊥, which in turn yields that there is a world in which ⊥, and we obtain a contradiction. Thus (a), (b), (c) and (d) cannot all hold. If we try using
the set is no longer independent, as (b') follows from (d). If instead we put
we again do not retain independence, as (c') follows from (a). A reformulation which avoids the explicit reference to actions, and therefore often is preferable, is Prakken and Sergot's [14] dog scenario: The fact that the Chisholm set cannot be formalized in standard deontic logic KD is traditionally called Chisholm's paradox. It is paradoxical only if one considers standard deontic logic as correct. A better name for it could thus be Chisholm's problem. Since the problem was posed by Chisholm in 1963, one of the greatest challenges for deontic logicians has been to find a solution: an alternative to standard deontic logic in which the Chisholm set can be formalized adequately.
The pragmatic oddity
In a precursor of [2] , Jones and Pörn [11] ] made a distinction between ideal and sub-ideal alternatives to a given world, using two relations R and R in the semantics and corresponding normal strong operators i and s . One defines
Ought A ⇐⇒ i A ∧ s ¬A the latter in order to incorporate violability. One requires that the disjoint relations R and R be serial, and that their union be reflexive. This implies that each world has ideal and sub-ideal alternatives, and is an ideal or sub-ideal alternative of itself. The formalization of the Chisholm set becomes
where
• H = He goes to help his neighbor,
• S = He lets the neighbor know that he is coming.
As was pointed out by Prakken and Sergot, we now get a subtle paradox which we may call the pragmatic oddity: We can deduce from (c) and (d) that Ought ¬S, and from (a) and (b) that i Ought S. So in all ideal alternatives to the given world, he goes to help the neighbor, and has a duty to say that he is coming, but does not say that he is coming. We must be aware of the danger that the distinction between actual and ideal duties induces an infinite sequence of operators; one could end up with i = 1 and then 2 , 3 , . . . as a prioritized sequence of duties with varying degree of actuality. This problem arose in an article by Carmo and Jones [2] . In the dog scenario we may view the problem as follows: If there is a dog, no sign, and no fence, then what is the actual duty; to get rid of the dog, to put up a fence, or to put up a fence?
The main idea in [2] is to incorporate the difference between the (f)actually possible and the potentially possible. It is an actual duty to put up a fence only if it is a factual necessity that there is a dog and no sign. Thus one avoids the pragmatic oddity and the infinite sequence of operators.
Requirements for any formalization
Seven reasonable requirements of any formalization of the dog scenario, put forward in [2] , are 1. Consistency and absence of moral conflict. The propositions in the dog scenario are consistent and do not contain any moral conflict; preferably one should not have a dog, and if that fails one should put up a sign; is this also violated then one ought to put up a fence.
2. Logical independence. None of the propositions are redundant; the set is finite in the sense that it is not equivalent to any proper subset of itself.
3. The same logical form for contrary-to-duty conditionals as for other deontic conditionals. Carmo and Jones point out that anything else makes a proposition's logical form depend on contingent facts (what happens to be duty) -which is on a collision course with the existing paradigm of logic.
4. Actual duties should be derivable. Depending on how inflexible the situation is, the actual duty should be to ensure either ¬H, S or G.
5. Ideal duties should be derivable. It is reasonable that it should be potentially possible for there to be no dog, so there should be an ideal duty to make sure that there is no dog.
6. A duty has been violated, given that there is a dog. Thus we must have viol(¬H).
7. In no sense should the pragmatic oddity, that a sign ought to warn against a non-existent dog, appear.
These are the requirements Carmo and Jones wanted to fulfill with the system we shall call CJ.
3 The formal system CJ Let us write P for power set.
Semantics. M = W, va, vp, pi, V , where
• V is a valuation (which we might just as well have called · ),
• pi : P(W ) → P(P(W )), and
(The real world is an actually possible world, and each actually possible world is a potentially possible world.)
(The contradictory context is not obligatory.)
(Relevance: whether or not a context Y is obligatory in a context X depends only on X ∩ Y .)
With B ⊆ A ⊆ W and
It follows from conditions (1) - (4)) that
Truth conditions.
We also define violation by viol(A) ⇐⇒ i A ∧ ¬A.
Proofs of results within the system
Proof.
Result 2 (Restricted factual detachment, [3, Section 4.4, item 14])
.
From → A and → B we obtain
and thus we obtain from (B | A) that B ∈ pi(va(w)), and we are done. (b) is similar.
Result 3 ([3, Section 4.4, item 15])
Proof. (a) We use the following tricks: It follows from (2) in the semantics that
Thus it suffices to show that
From (4) in the semantics we now get
which after some distribution of ∩ and ∪ gives
and ¬A ∨ B ∈ pi(va(w)).
(b) is similar.
Result 4 (Restricted deontic detachment [3, Result 2(vii) page 294])
Proof. Similar to the proof of Result 3. The system does not have unlimited deontic detachment,
Result 5 (Strong violability, [3, Section 4.4, item 12])
Proof. (a) We have va(w) ∩ ¬A = ∅ and thus ¬ a A. Furthermore, we have
and thus ¬A ∈ pi(va(w)) ⇐⇒ ∅ ∈ pi(va(w)) ⇐⇒ ⊥.
Result 6 (Strong classicality, [3, Section 4.4, item 13])
from the semantics. (b) is similar.
Corollary 7 (Strong classicality II, [3, Result 2(vi) page 293])
Proof. (a) We have va(w) ⊆ A and thus A∧B ∩va(w) = B ∩va(w) which gives A ∧ B ∈ pi(va(w)) ⇐⇒ B ∈ pi(va(w)).
Moreover, we have
The corollary may seem strange. If it is a factual necessity that there is a war in the world, and a factual duty to make sure that old ladies are helped crossing the street, does it follow that there is a factual duty to make sure that there is war and old ladies are helped across the street?
4 Analysis of CJ and related systems
The operators
In [2] the authors employ five operators:
• → A (Weak necessity, It is not an actual possibility that not A)
• A (Strong necessity, It is not a potential possibility that not A)
• a A (Actual duty)
Note that the notation is inspired by probability theory, where P (B | A) often denotes the probability that B, given that A.
The way the system CJ is defined, we may distinguish the following:
• The actually possible, |= x → A
• The potentially possible, |= x A
• That which is contingent but not potentially possible, (|= x ¬A) ∧ (∃y ∈ W )(|= yA)
• The contradictory, |= ¬A The effect of letting vp(x) = W is that the category for propositions that are not contradictory but still not potentially possible disappears. None of the scenarios discussed in [2] have any use for this category. Letting vp(x) = W is a simplification in the sense that we do not need to worry about what vp should be, and a anti-simplification in the sense that the definition of the semantics for the system becomes one line longer.
It follows directly from the truth conditions that and → are normal operators. Indeed, we can let
and
where xR a y(xR i y)
is read y is an actual (potential) alternative to x.
The condition w ∈ va(w) ⊆ vp(w) ensures that and → satisfy the axiom T:
a and i are classical operators, and (· | ·) is classical with respect to each of its arguments (the antecedent and the consequent). This follows from the fact that its arguments, propositions A and B, in the truth conditions only appear as A and B .
An operator C is classical if it satisfies
For a and i we have violability (|= ¬ a,i ) and fulfill-ability (|= ¬ a,i ⊥) as well as closure under conjunction: the schema
Violability follows from the truth conditions, whereas fulfill-ability and closure under conjunction are (1) and (3) in the semantics for pi. The converse implication, the schema
is in contradiction with violability; a A ⇒ a (A ∧ ) ⇒ a ( ), so then, if there is an actual duty, all tautologies become obligatory.
(B | A) is a classical conditional A ⇒ B
The truth condition for a classical conditional is
for suitable f , whereas we in CJ have
, that is, independently of the possible world x. To replace only if by iff we define
which proves the proposition in the header: because then
(· | ·) is still independent of x, as x only appears formally as argument of f : we have (∀x, y ∈ W )(f (x, X) = f (y, X)).
Implication follows from equivalence, but closure under equivalence follows from closure under given that commutes with ∧, i.e.,that we have the schemata M and C. Perhaps we may say in a sketchy way that closure under a weak condition is a stronger demand than closure under a strong condition.
Deontic and factual detachment
Deontic detachment is the schema
whereas factual detachment is
Deontic detachment suggests a reading of (B | A) as it is obligatory that B, given that it is obligatory that A, or ideally, it is obligatory that B given that A.
Factual detachment suggests a reading of (B | A) as it is obligatory that B, given that A is the case, or it is factually obligatory that B given that A.
Carmo and Jones write that (FD) and (DD) allow for the deduction of, respectively, actual and ideal duties. The in contrast with their own system CJ in which one in fact can derive both actual and ideal duties using limited versions of each of (FD) and (DD). We may say that within deontic logic there is a (DD)-school, an (FD)-school and an (SA)-school, where (SA), strengthening of the antecedent, is the schema
The schema (SA) is ill-fitting for, e.g., a conditional for typical circumstances, since the circumstances in which A ∧ A can be atypical considered as circumstances in which A. The modality under typical circumstances has a parallel in deontic logic, under ideal circumstances. If we allow both (FD) and (DD) we can deduce a moral conflict from the Chisholm set, and (SA) is incompatible with (FD):
In [2] , limited versions of (FD) and (DD) hold, each in a version for factual and a version for ideal duties. (SA) holds under the condition that (A∧A ∧B). This follows directly from the truth conditions for (· | ·), since
The logic CJ thus does not take into account the problem associated with (SA). This means nothing more than: CJ is a system with a limited purpose. When a duty is not fulfilled it could indeed be chalked up to two reasons: the duty only applies ceteris paribus, or it has been violated. Only the latter possibility is treated in [2] and constitutes the core of Chisholm's problem.
Castañeda and the distinction between practitions and propositions
Hector-Neri Castañeda has made many contributions to deontic logic, among which one from [10] is considered here. The central idea is to distinguish between practitions and propositions. Practitions are expressions that grammatically tend to come after words like shall and ought. One lets the deontic operator be a function from the class of practitions to the class of propositions. That is, the proposition He ought to go help his neighbor is analyzed as Ought(he, to go help the neighbor)
and not as Ought(He goes to help the neighbor).
Castañeda formalizes Chisholm's paradox as
• ¬A → ¬ B
• ¬A where practitions are written using capital letters (A), and propositions using lower-case letters (a). He uses the axiom
where A and B are practitions. We can deduce that ¬ B. We cannot deduce that B, since we do not have (A → B), but (a → B). We distinguish between the proposition he goes to help the neighbor and the practition (he)(to go help the neighbor).
Castañeda admits that Chisholm's paradox can also be solved in other ways, but then only by creating unnecessarily complicated systems. Among these he also counts CJ. But he writes that Chisholm's paradox cannot arise in systems where one distinguishes between propositions and practitions.
The objection to Castañeda. In the dog scenario it does not seem to be necessary to use practitions. If Castañeda accepts the axiom
he does not get rid of Chisholm's problem, and Ka seems just as reasonable as KA.
(B | A) not captured as no problems A → B nor as (A → B) Table 1 : Problems with normal and monadic representation of deontic logic. 
The trajectory of philosophical logic
The development within philosophical logic seems to be in the direction of greater complexity of syntax and semantics (see Table 1 ). Some argue for the use of quantifiers, temporal operators and action operators, while others like [2] take a more abstract approach while still finding a need for a rich conceptual apparatus. CJ is also a fairly weak logic. The best label we can put on CJ according to Chellas' classification [5] seems to be CECD': conditional logic (C) which is classical (E) and has the schemata (C) and (D'):
If one is to extrapolate from this one may end up with maxims like
The richer the semantics, the better.
The weaker the logic, the better.
as a limiting case: For each semantics for deontic logic theere is then a richer semantics more suited for the purpose. In the transition from normal to classical systems, i.e., from standard models to minimal models, one obtains a richer semantics and a weaker logic. The same can be said about the transition from classical monadic systems to classical conditional logic systems like CJ. The central deontic component in the semantics here, pi, is a higher-level object in the following sense: where one in the original semantics of Kripke et al. only encounters semantic expressions of complexity x ∈ va(y), in CJ one also finds, e.g., X ∈ pi(Y ). Since here X, Y ⊆ W = , i.e., X, Y ∈ P(W ), we may say that we have applied the power set operation once to the semantics. See Table 2 .
Lewis' contrafactual conditionals. As with CJ, Lewis' contrafactual conditional logic can be viewed as a classical conditional logic.
Lewis' logic has an application as deontic conditional logic. Lewis' system also illustrates how semantics richer than Kripke semantics can be useful. In Lewis' system we have |= x If A had been the case, then B would have been the case (a subjunctive conditional) interpreted as There exist worlds where A ∧ B that are closer to x than all worlds in which A ∧ ¬B
The deontic variant is
There exist worlds where A ∧ B that are better, from the point of view of x, than all worlds in which A ∧ ¬B It is interesting how easy it is to incorporate ethical relativism in deontic logic: just let the truth value of a deontic proposition be dependent upon x. Propositions of the form (B | A) in CJ do not satisfy this in principle, but in practice the best fitting X in the condition
will often be va(x) or vp(x). That is because we tend to have side conditions to (B | A) of the type |= x → A and |= x → B, which gives exactly
The fact that Lewis' logic is a classical conditional logic we may obtain by letting
where a ≤ x b means that a is better than b seen from x, morally speaking. Here we shall show that this schema is not valid in CJ, which is symptomatic for (· | ·)'s independence of va and vp. Generally, the diagnosis seems to have to be that in CJ, Ought implies can holds if can is understood as logical possibility, but not if can is understood as potential possibility. According toÅqvist [1] there are two things one can ask in connection with Kant's Ought implies can principle: what is meant by implies and what is meant by can. According toÅqvist the most natural answer is that implies is understood as logical consequence (the concept that philosophical logicians are striving to formalize) whereas can is understood as a practical possibility, which in CJ would mean or → .
Proof. To define our counter-model, let
The prove this we go through the semantic conditions for CJ and check whether the model agrees with them all. The condition (2)
is trivially (in fact, in the sense of propositional calculus) satisfied for X = ∅ and X = {w} since |= P C p → (⊥ ⇐⇒ ⊥).)
For X = W we get just a set-theoretical fact,
which entails no new information. For X = {y} we must try Y = {y} and then we get
so if Z = W we get W ∈ pi({y}) which we already know. The condition (3)
says that pi(X) is closed under intersection, and this we can see is satisfied since {y} ∩ W = {y}. For the condition (4)
we must choose Y such that pi(Y ) = ∅. Case (i): Y = W . Then we must have Z = W and we just get
Case (ii): Y = {y}. In order that X ∈ pi(Y ) and X ⊆ Y we must have X = Y . With Z = X we then get a tautology whereas with Z = W we get W ∈ pi(W ) which we already have. Thus all the semantic conditions are satisfied, and the Theorem has been proved.
If we also include the condition
then pi({w}) = U ({w}), where U (X) = { Y : X ⊆ Y }.
A three-point model C 3 for the Chisholm set
Consider the following sentences A and B.
He goes to help his neighbor.
He says that he is coming.
A reasonable interpretation of the Chisholm set, mention in [2] , suggests that the following propositions hold:
Thus, he has decided to not go to help, and so far he is not saying that he is coming, but he has not yet decided whether to say that he is coming, and it is potentially possible that he both goes to help and says that he is coming.
The following model C 3 with just three points preserves all these distinctions.
(The verification of that fact is too detailed to give here.) To indicate the simplest part of C 3 first: Let W = {x, y, z}
This is the only way to give the propositions A and B the correct modal status using only three points. We want the extended Chisholm set to be satisfied in the point x. Regarding y and z we may, for example, let va(y) = vp(y) = {y} and va(z) = vp(z) = {z}.
The hard part is to find a pi which is stabile under the four semantic conditions on π.
After some computer computation we ended up with
We see that A ⇐⇒ B is the smallest context that belongs to each nonempty pi(X), which is reasonable. We also see that in the context where he does not go, but does say that he is coming, we can do without duties whatsoever, i.e., pi( ¬A ∧ B ) = ∅. The pragmatic oddity has been avoided in the sense that (∀X)( ¬A ∧ B = {y} ∈ pi(X)).
It is more tricky to design models for classical than for normal conditional logic. But it can be done. Creativity does not seem to be required; one starts with all relations empty and looks at each condition to see what needs to be added to the relations. Additionally one must check that the model does not become too rich. Two disjoint sets cannot both be in pi(X), for example, as this would contradict
and ∅ ∈ pi(X).
(1 revisited)
But again, it is easiest to let a computer do this labor. Tautologies are never obligatory (mandatory) in CJ in the sense that we would have a or i . We may have ( | A) as that just means that all nonempty contexts X contained in A satisfy W ∈ pi(X). We see that C 3 |= ( | A).
Three interpretations of the dog scenario
Consider the following sentences.
There is a dog.
There is a sign.
There is a fence.
We now show how the expressive power of CJ can be used in three different cases. The deontic component of the dog scenario is
whereas the alethic components can vary:
First case: There is a dog, but not by factual necessity. Premises:
Second case: There is by factual necessity a dog. Premises:
Third case: It is factually necessary that there is a dog and no sign, but it is potentially possible that there is a sign and no dog; there is no fence but it is factually possible that there is a fence. This is meaningful if we interpret factual necessity as the result of a decision, and potential possibility as coherence with practical or physical possibilities for action. This case constitutes the big test of strength for the system as far as whether it can represent notorious sinners -agents who violate those duties that arise when (other) duties have been violated. Premises:
which is reasonable. This case incorporates CTCTD, violation of contrary-toduty conditionals. The reason that we at all can deduce viol is Result 2, which allows us to deduce (A → B) given that (B | A).
Calculation of models of CJ using Maple
It is of interest to construct a model of the dog-sign-fence scenario, in order to judge how the system CJ tackles 2nd Level CTDs. To consider this set of sentences abstracted from their meaning, let us relabel alphabetically:
The set of propositions that we seek a model for is: Let va(a) = {a, b} and vp(a) = W . We would like the set of propositions to be satisfied in world a. Ipso facto, the propositions where pi does not occur in the corresponding truth conditions are satisfied. Using Maple we input some values for pi obtained from the truth conditions of the four propositions that are of the form (· | ·) in our extended Chisholm set. The extension of this to a complete definition of pi was best left to a computer. We found that pi(X) = ∅ except for the case where X = ∅ and X = {a}. This is quite satisfying since {a} = A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C .
Given that we are stuck in a context where there is a dog, no sign, and no fence, we are in a hopeless situation which deontically speaking is best compared to the contradictory context ∅.
A new result
In [2] the authors mention that (5), (Z ∈ pi(X)) ∧ (Y ⊆ X) ∧ (Y ∩ Z = ∅) → (Z ∈ pi(Y )), (5 revisited) might be a reasonable semantic condition on pi to add to (1), (2), (3) and (4).
Lemma 9. Suppose (A | ) is true in a model of CJ where W = {a, b, c} and A = {a}. Then pi must satisfy (∀X ⊆ W )(a ∈ X → pi(X) = U ({a})).
Proof. This can be reproduced by hand or using a computer, by going through (1), (2), (3) and (4) until pi has stabilized. 
and the Theorem has been proved.
The semantic conditions we needed in order to get from each line to the next are thus (1), (2), (3) and (5) . To prove the Lemma we also needed (4) .
Thus, we cannot use (5) together with the other semantic conditions on pi to formalize deontic scenarios. The condition (5) expresses a supposition that the mandatory in a context is preserved when passing to a more specific context, as long as the fulfillment of the mandate is compatible with the new context. 
